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This paper examines the philosophical substructure to the theoretical conflicts that permeate contemporary mental
health care in the UK. Theoretical conflicts are treated here as those that arise among practitioners holding diver-
gent theoretical orientations towards the phenomena being treated. Such conflicts, although steeped in history,
have become revitalized by recent attempts at integrating mental health services that have forced diversely trained
practitioners to work collaboratively together, often under one roof. Part I of this paper examines how the history
of these conflicts can be understood as a tension between, on the one hand, the medical model and its use by
the dominant profession of psychiatry, and on the other, those alternative models and practitioners in some way
differentiated from the medical model camp. Examples will be given from recent policy and research to highlight
the prevalence of this tension in contemporary practice. Part II of this paper explores the deeper commonalities
that lay beneath the theoretical conflict outlined in Part I. These commonalities will be shown to be apart of a cap-
tivating framework that has continued to grip the conflict since its inception. By exposing this underlying frame-
work–and the motivations inherent therein–the topic of integration appears in wholly different light, allowing a
renewed philosophical basis for integration to emerge.
Introduction
In the UK there has been much talk of “integrating”
mental health services in recent years–a topic usually
couched within a broader government agenda of assimi-
lating health and social care. Parallel movements
towards service integration can be found in North
America [1] and throughout the developed and develop-
ing world [2]. In the UK, pathways towards integration
have been paved by the Health Act Flexibilities (1999),
which removed financial and legal constraints hindering
service integration, and the Health and Social Care Act
(2001), which created Care Trusts aimed to deliver a
whole spectrum of services within a single organization.
The topic of service integration gains much of its
appeal by appearing to make sense virtually “across the
board,” from the politicians and commissioners focused
on partnerships and integrated budgets, to the practi-
tioners focused on integrated working and service
delivery, right down to the service user accessing a more
convenient and reliable set of services provided by a
“team” of professionals. Indeed, service integration has
repeatedly been promoted in this sweeping manner
[3-5].
Those in the midst of such integration, however, rea-
lize that it carries a number of conflicts, many of which
are hardly new. One longstanding conflict poised to
come to the fore by recent integration measures lies
within divergent theoretical orientations towards the
phenomena being treated. By “theoretical orientations” I
wish to connote those views generally held among prac-
titioners, either as a result of educational training or
area of work (or both). Nowhere is this arguably more
prevalent than in the formation of “community mental
health teams” (CMHTs)–a hallmark of service integra-
tion over the past decade–whereby diversely trained
practitioners are placed under one roof and, ideally, in
regular contact with each other to exchange ideas and
skills. As promising as this multidisciplinary, team-based
approach may seem, the reality within such teams is* Correspondence: nmg2128@columbia.edu
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often a cacophony of professional opinions, reinforced
by deep-seated theoretical orientations [6].
This paper examines the philosophical substructure to
the theoretical conflicts that permeate contemporary
mental health care in the UK. Such conflicts have a ten-
dency to overlay themselves onto philosophical chasms;
by understanding these deeper differences–and their
commonalities–new light may be shed on supposedly
intractable barriers of thought or opinion.
Part I
A Diagnosis of Conflict
For many, it comes as no surprise that the field of men-
tal health is plagued with division in both theory and
practice. As psychiatrist Anthony Clare (2002) notes,
“many of us in the field cannot agree on ‘what we are
doing’, let alone ‘where we are doing it’ and ‘why’.” And
it is these and other questions which, as Clare states,
“still plague psychiatry two centuries on from the dawn
of the scientific revolution...because psychiatry, of all the
branches in medicine, is concerned with the most intri-
cate and challenging questions concerning human life,
namely the relationships between brain and mind,
between genes and environment, between the individual
and the group, between family and society, between the
transcendent and the mundane” ([7], p.xv).
The community mental health team (CMHT)–a team
comprised of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers,
community psychiatric nurses, occupational therapists,
and other specialized workers–is one such setting where
a diversity of views manifests in practice. Despite a
diversity of views seeming beneficial, one clear concern
has arisen from those practitioners trained within a
“social orientation"–predominantly social workers–who
fear that the “social perspective” and “social values”
could lose their importance in the new multidisciplinary
setting. This fear is exacerbated by integration measures
taking place “higher up” with the formation of Care
Trusts, which, despite aiming to deliver a spectrum of
services under a single organization, commission such
services almost exclusively through primary care [8].
The “social orientation” has recently been clarified by
the Social Perspectives Network (SPN)–a UK organiza-
tion comprised of academics, practitioners, policy
makers and service users that takes as its focus the clari-
fication of social models and their implementation in
practice. SPN is quick to point out that the social orien-
tation is not merely to be conflated with practical issues
such as benefits and housing. Instead they clarify two
core principles of the social orientation to mental disor-
der (or what they also refer to as “mental distress”):
In one sense, mental distress may be seen as a reac-
tion to a range of social circumstances and
relationships (past and present) that may be experi-
enced as painful, contradictory, unjust, excluding or
oppressive, and where no other avenue for resolution
appears to present itself. In this sense, it may often
link with issues of powerlessness and loss. In another
sense, what may be seen as the manifestations of
mental distress, such as voice hearing or self harm-
ing, may also be understood as the best available set
of coping or survival strategies that a person may be
able to access, given their particular history and
social circumstances. In this sense, distress may
paradoxically be seen as a reflection of people’s
resourcefulness and ingenuity ([9], p.3-4).
Thus, from the social orientation, expressions of men-
tal disorder are seen as meaningful responses to stress
in a person’s life; moreover, such stress is relative to the
given environment in which the person is embedded [9].
Not surprisingly, the social orientation is often both
compared and promoted in opposition to a medical
orientation. The archetypal medical model is portrayed
as viewing mental disorder like all other medical ill-
nesses and, hence, biological, chemical or physical in
origin. As Bolton & Hill (1996) point out, there is an
inherent a priori inference in this model that “psycholo-
gical disorder is the breakdown of psycho-logic...of
meaning, rationality, and so on, and beyond this limit
we apparently have to abandon our normal intentional
forms of explanation...and posit instead causal processes
at the biological level which disrupt normal processes”
([10], p. 26). The medical orientation has been classically
uninterested in meaning and meaningful explanations
since these do not fall within the domain of the natural
sciences, which have as their subject matter the objec-
tive, observable, causal and ultimately physical world
[11,12].
Historically, this difference between the medical and
social orientations was first theoretically articulated in
psychiatry by Karl Jaspers (1913) with his celebrated dis-
tinction between meaningful and causal connections. As
is well known, for Jaspers, this distinction implied a
splitting of tasks for psychiatry [13]. The drawing of
meaningful connections required the psychiatrist to
assume the role of phenomenologist, charting the men-
tal states of others through empathic understanding. Jas-
pers differentiated such a practice from the drawing of
objective, causal connections between “brain-behavior”
relationships from an external perspective. At the time
of Jaspers’ writing, this distinction was reinforced by a
larger assumption pervading the social ethos that the
realm of meaning was distinct from the realm of physi-
cal causes, as exemplified by the emergence of the new
Geist, or human, sciences as distinct from the natural
sciences [10].
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Where the field of mental health would go with Jas-
pers’ distinction proved formative and controversial.
Although Jaspers himself held “even handedly” to the
two projects of psychiatry, his contemporaries would
arguably see them as mutually and radically opposed,
whereby one did either one or the other, but rarely both
[14]. This split was largely fueled by two implicit
assumptions embedded within the discipline: namely,
that the move from understanding to explaining meant
a drop down “ below” the mental level and into the bio-
logical and physical realms of brain and behavior; and
secondly, that there was a necessary link between the
belief in the inaccessibility of empathic understanding
and a belief in biological or physiological causation [15].
Combined, these assumptions worked to imply that the
move from understanding to explaining was a move that
ruled out, as if by default, any more meaning and
method in madness.
As Bolton (1997, 2004) makes clear, such tension
reached its breaking point in the 1960s and 1970s, with
medical psychiatry aligning with scientific behavioral
psychology to champion the methodology of the natural
sciences and psychoanalysis aligning with antipsychiatry
to champion meaning, values, and the methodology of
the social sciences [14,16]. In particular, antipsychiatry
would call into question medical psychiatry’s benignly
objective and sub-personal status of mentally disordered
phenomena, emphasizing the value-laden, socially con-
structed nature of these same phenomena. According to
antipsychiatry, it was in value-laden culture where one
was to find the true answers to the suffering associated
with, what Thomas Szasz (1962) would call, “problems
in living” [17].
More of the Same
Some may now believe that the field has largely moved
on since this period of crisis, through various conces-
sions made on either side of the divide, along with
wholly new paradigms being made available (cf. propo-
nents of the biopsychosocial [18,19] and cognitive beha-
vioral paradigms [10]). Nevertheless the issues that
defined this historical conflict continue to resurface in
various guises. This section will examine two domains
where this conflict has reemerged–public policy and
academic research.
The debate between the medical and social orienta-
tions has carried over to the policy context with the pas-
sage of the Disability Discrimination Act in the UK
(1995) - an act that legally mandates certain rights for
people diagnosed with mental disorder. On the one
hand, this act seems to carry an implicit social orienta-
tion in the way it places legal requirements on employ-
ers and businesses to make “reasonable adjustments” to
the work force environment through tackling those
factors that make a disability “disabling” [20]. But the
DDA has also been criticized by civil rights groups as
implicitly “medical” in the way it defines disabled people
as people with certain “limitations” that restrict their
day-to-day living instead of attributing such restrictions
to society [21].
Another area of UK policy where this conflict mani-
fests is in clinical governance, in particular with the
recent formation of the Social Care Institute of Excel-
lence (SCIE) in the shadow of the National Institute of
Clinical Excellence (NICE). Interestingly, both of these
agencies promote the implementation of “evidence-
based practice,” but view the topic of what constitutes
“evidence” through significantly different lenses. The
SCIE promotes the use of qualitative evidence and the
methods of the social sciences, while the NICE pro-
motes quantitative evidence and the methods of the nat-
ural sciences. Furthermore, SCIE, in keeping with the
social orientation, proclaims to “have a service user
focus,” “promote empowerment and change,” and “be
independent in research and findings” [22]. This con-
trasts with the NICE agenda to produce “clinical guide-
lines on the appropriate treatment of people with
specific diseases and conditions within the NHS” [23].
The clear differences in language here is seemingly yet
another tool in which to distance the medical and social
orientations. The practical impact of these governing
bodies is powerful, for as one socially-orientated
researcher points out, the consequences of an “overly
medical” approach to governance “is that resources are
directed into impairment-related research and interven-
tion, whereas scant resources are channeled into social
change for the inclusion of people with social disabil-
ities... [An] example is research within gene therapy that
strives to ‘cure disability’ while ignoring the social and
cultural factors that make not walking, hearing, seeing
etc. into a problem” [20].
The Colombo et al. study
Theoretical conflicts in contemporary mental health ser-
vice settings are now becoming a topic of academic
research. Precursors in this area include investigations
into the differences between formal medical principles
found in the literature and practitioners’ assumptions
[24] and the power relations between practitioners
themselves and between practitioners and service users
[25,26].
Of particular interest is a recent study carried out by a
team of psychiatrists, sociologists and philosophers at
Warwick University that proposed to examine “the
influence of implicit models of mental disorder on pro-
cesses of shared decision making within community-
based multi-disciplinary teams,” or CMHTs ([6], p.
1558). This study consisted of 100 participants
Gerard Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:4
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/4
Page 3 of 8
responding to 12 open-ended questions concerning a
case vignette. The vignette described a person whose
behavior would suggest the diagnosis of schizophrenia
according to the DSM-IV (see appendix for vignette).
The participants were divided into five groups (20 in
each group), three of which were professionals working
in community mental health teams, including psychia-
trists, community psychiatric nurses and social workers.
The other two groups consisted of patients with long-
term schizophrenia and their informal carers. The
responses to the 12 questions were measured against 6
“ideal type” theoretical models identified through a lit-
erature review. These models included the medical,
social, cognitive-behavioral, psycho-therapeutic, family,
and conspiratorial. Each model was given a theoretical
and practical component, with the former consisting of
such things as “diagnosis/definition” of mental disorder,
“interpretations of behavior,” and “etiology,” and the lat-
ter consisting of “treatment” and “prognosis.”
The “ideal type” medical and social models were por-
trayed as follows ([6], p. 1559) in table 1:
When it came to interpreting the case vignette, one of
the most striking findings showed that 91.3% of psychia-
trists’ responses matched with the “ideal type” medical
model as compared with 8.8% of social workers’
responses. Furthermore, when it came to within-group
agreement, all 20 of the psychiatrists’ responses matched
with the medical model on “diagnosis/definition,” “etiol-
ogy” and “treatment.” The social workers were more
divided among themselves, perhaps reflecting the
broader scope of the social orientation. For instance,
when it came to those same categories among social
workers (i.e. “diagnosis/definition,” “etiology” and “treat-
ment”), roughly half matched the psycho-therapeutic
model, and half the social model. Interestingly, and
despite this internal division, social workers were
virtually unanimous in not matching the medical model
on most all responses.
Another aim of the study was to investigate power-
relations among practitioners through the use of semi-
structured interviews based on the topic of successful
and unsuccessful integrated working. In these interviews,
a psychiatrist is quoted as saying “because of these ideo-
logical differences, communication is often defined in
terms of a struggle between mental health and social
services in which each service tries to gain control of
the situation through pushing their own perspective”
([6], p. 1566). And a social worker, describing his role
among the community mental health teams, states: “to
be frank...to clip the wings of the psychiatrists” ([6], p.
1566). If only anecdotal, such statements give us a
further glimpse into the current state of affairs among
practitioners and how it tends to cleavage along medical
versus social lines.
When taken together, these recent examples in both
public policy and academic research suggest, in the
least, that the field has not wholly transcended this the-
oretical tension. Instead, the various guises in which this
tension manifests suggest that the field may be prisoner
to its assumptions at a deeper level. A recent observa-
tion made by a group of psychologists and psychiatrists,
this time in the US and associated with the Recovery
Movement, succinctly captures much of the above:
Two apparently very different approaches to the
treatment of mentally ill persons are emerging. The
scientific, objective, evidence-based approach empha-
sizes external scientific reality, whereas the recovery
model stresses the importance of the phenomenolo-
gical, subjective experiences and autonomous rights
of persons who are in recovery. The two models will
conflict under many circumstances (Frese, Stanley,
Kress, Vogel-Scibilia 2003, [27] p. 22).
Table 1 Medical and Social Models
Theoretical
Diagnosis/definition: “physical health-illness continuum”
Interpretations of behavior: “symptoms of illness as a (rough) guide to severity”
Etiology: “physiochemical changes in the brain/genetic factors”
Practical
Treatment: “medical and surgical procedures, drugs etc.”
Prognosis: “many symptoms can be controlled”
Theoretical
Diagnosis/definition: “health/low stress/high stress continuum”
Interpretations of behavior: “symptoms indicate degrees of stress”
Etiology: “social economic stress, cultural conflict, marginal status, etc.”
Practical
Treatment: “social change to reduce stress”
Prognosis: “good if changes made at the social level”
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The resurfacing of this tension may ironically be the
result of integration measures themselves in so far as
they have forced practitioners to work collaboratively
together, often under one roof and within the same
guidelines. Better understanding the roots of this con-
flict is crucial for assessing the future prospects of inte-
gration in theory and practice.
PART II
A Worthy Gesture? - “What” & “Where”
The Colombo et al. study discussed above provides a
potent example of theoretical conflict in contemporary
practice. Despite the clear divergences in professional
opinion highlighted in this study, a subtle but important
convergence can be found among all participants that is
little explored; namely, all participants recognized and
seemingly felt compelled to provide an account of the
phenomenon in the vignette that went by the term
“mental disorder.” Of course, the conditions of the study
would likely contribute to this shared behavior, such as
the study’s design, the vignette used, and the researchers
and participants involved, but the behavior itself argu-
ably resides much deeper. The historical and contem-
porary survey outlined above suggests that the field does
share, if only minimally, an agreement that there is
some such thing (or set of things), which seems to
necessitate, if not demand, a number of responses
(understanding, explaining, alleviating, containing,
appreciating, etc). And yet the agreement often stops
here, for to paraphrase Clare quoted earlier, we can
hardly agree on “what” this something is, let alone
“where” it is located [7].
In the 1970s, the debate on the concept of mental dis-
order was dominated by two radically different “whats”
and “wheres,” as indicated by the two competing terms
then wrestling for status–"mental illness” versus “pro-
blem in living.” The former connoted something objec-
tive and biological in constitution (a disease) which was
more or less precisely situated (in an individual’s mind)
while the later suggested something context-sensitive
and personal, or interpersonal, in constitution (a pro-
blem) and vaguely situated (in “life”). And yet, the very
reason that these two terms were vigorously debated
was because they purported to denote the same (or at
least a very similar) phenomenon.
A number of theoretical implications can be filtered
from this landmark debate, such as whether “what” we
gesture at is an objective fact or social value, and
whether “where” we gesture is sub-personal, personal or
supra-personal; or, if that which we gesture at entails all
of these things (perhaps an accurate reflection of more
contemporary models), whether we can (or should)
tease the theoretical points apart, setting aside the
biological facts from the social values, the sub-personal
from the personal from the supra-personal.
The above points are raised not to attempt an answer
but to highlight what seems to be a captivating frame-
work that encapsulates this debate along with much of
the field of mental health. Central to this framework is a
picture of the phenomenon of mental disorder as having
a double existence, at once grounded in “exterior” rea-
lity, while at the same time also embedded in a shared
“interior” life of meanings. From this picture, two major
options emerge for handling this double existence: either
take one side and universalize it at the expense of the
other–an option exploited historically by the medical
and social orientations alike (and perhaps more recently
by various grand visions of cognitive science and neu-
roscience)–or accept this double existence as an inevita-
ble dualism of sorts. This latter option is taken more
rarely since any mention of dualism often leaves many
philosophers and clinicians impatient, having claimed to
“deconstruct” or “transcend” the notion long ago.
Neither option, however, thinks through the motivations
that give rise to this picture and that, when left unexa-
mined, continue to regenerate the picture in its various
guises.
To begin examining these motivations, a philosophical
parallel can be borrowed from philosopher Charles Tay-
lor in his discussions on the foundationalist project in
philosophy [28]. This project, which finds it clearest
expression in Descartes’ attempt at stabilizing doubt in
order to arrive at a foundation based on a clear and iso-
lated case of reason alone, is motivated by what Taylor
calls an “ontologizing of method.” For Taylor (2002),
this method upholds that “ [t]he right way to deal with
puzzles and build a reliable body of knowledge is to
break the issue down into sub-questions, identify the
chains of inference, dig down to an inference-free start-
ing point, and then build by a reliable method.” Taylor
continues: “ [o]nce this comes to seem the all-purpose
nostrum for thinking, then one has an over-whelming
motivation to believe that that is how the mind actually
works in taking in the world” ([28], p. 109-110). This
same “ontologizing of method” can be detected in the
field of mental health’s theoretical attempts at circum-
scribing the phenomenon of mental disorder in so far as
this phenomenon, too, is taken as a puzzle to be dealt
with by breaking down into sub-questions–in this case,
a clear double existence–from which to then build back
up broader theoretical orientations. The trouble with
this method is two-fold: firstly–and most obvious–the
process of “building back up” that entails connecting
these nicely bifurcated interior and exterior words is
thwarted by its very own method, which previously
called for their irreconcilable split. History has shown a
way around this by “building back up” one side at the
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expense of the other, but the end result is rarely without
controversy. Secondly–and less obvious but more
important–the method itself is so ingrained, as Taylor
points out, that it stands as a proxy for how the mind
actually takes in the world, and thus by extension, the
phenomenon of mental disorder.
The abovementioned framework is highlighted not to
downplay the advances made in mental health or philo-
sophy, but rather to provide a window into the origins
of the seemingly intractable conflict between the medi-
cal and social orientations. By dividing our reality into
these two worlds–a world of facts independent of inter-
pretation and a world of meanings constructed on a
shared interior life–to appease our foundationalist moti-
vations, we have not only ensured interminable conflict
(byway of interminable oscillations between these two
irreconcilable worlds), but have adhered to a reality far
removed from our actual relationship with the phenom-
enon in question; that is to say, our relationship with
the human being. For Taylor, “ [o]ur understanding of
the world is holistic from the start” ([28], p. 113). Now
such a perspective would be comforting if only it were
consistent with the knowledge we have of ourselves,
which is often divided, fractured. In fact, as examined
below, our understanding of the world and ourselves is
precariously both holistic and divided; a point easily
overlooked by unconsciously adhering to a framework
that ignores how the phenomenon associated with men-
tal disorder comes into view and why one feels com-
pelled to gesture at it, and instead consumed itself with
questions as to “what” and “where” it really is, coupled
with what can or should be done about it.
Coming Into View
There is an aspect of Karl Jaspers’ work that points to
this initial moment of recognizing the phenomenon of
mental disorder prior to theoretical or practical elucida-
tion. Recall Jaspers was exceptional in his ability to hold
even-handedly the two tasks of psychiatry–drawing
meaningful connections from within vs. drawing casual
connections from without–and resisted the temptation
to pin one method against the other for competitive
advantage [14]. Jaspers’ tolerance here arguably makes
sense in the context of his later career transition into
existential philosophy [29]. Intimations of an existential
tone can be found in this now famous passage from Jas-
pers’ (1913) Allegemeine Psychopathologie:
The most profound distinction in psychic life seems
to be that between what is meaningful and allows
empathy and what in its particular way is ununder-
standable ([13], p. 577).
This passage is famous, however, not because of any
existential awe it may connote, but due to its concrete
suggestion of a “barrier to understanding” in mental dis-
order. In light of Jaspers’ distinction between meaningful
and causal connections, this passage could be read as
signifying the definitive end to the hermeneutic or phe-
nomenological quest for meaning, whereby one should
now move (i.e. drop down) to causal explanation.
Jaspers himself was well aware of this common move
in the form of physical reductionism, which in his day
was a Kraepelinian one. In particular, it was precisely
Emil Kraepelin’s reductionist move carried out on schi-
zophrenia–a move which took a felt-sense of incompre-
hensibility and hastily translated it into an “inevitable
and progressive mental deterioration,” an “orchestra
without a conductor"–that Jaspers hoped to avoid. Tak-
ing this historical context into consideration, Jaspers’
famous quote above is just as much an attempt to resist
the temptation to comprehend “schizophrenic” phenom-
ena by physical explanation alone as it is a statement to
any “barrier to understanding.” In fact, Jaspers–unlike
both his predecessors and successors–was seemingly
able to rest in the phenomenon’s utter strangeness
which was “inaccessible” yet “profound.” Perhaps for Jas-
pers, as psychologist Louis Sass (1992) suggests, “schizo-
phrenic experience remained unintelligible not because
it was beneath understanding but because it was beyond
it,” plausibly residing in that “ununderstandable essence
of existence” that proved central to Jaspers’ later exis-
tential philosophy ([15], p. 18, 409).
Put differently, Jaspers was seemingly able to recog-
nize and appreciate the moment in which the phenom-
enon associated with mental disorder comes into view–
the moment of recognition–prior to exercising the need
for understanding or explaining. Parallel interest in this
basic moment of human disconnect prior to theoretical
elucidation can be found in philosopher Ludwig Witt-
genstein’s discussions on rule-following, and in particu-
lar, how one comes to recognize a disruption, or “break”
in a rule. As Wittgenstein (1953) states in the Philoso-
phical Investigations:
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2)
beyond 1000- and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
We say to him: “Look what you’ve done!"- He
doesn’t understand. We say: “You were meant to
add two: look how you began the series!” ([30], para.
185)
And in the Brown Book (1958): “If a child does not
respond to the suggestive gesture, it is separated from
the others and treated as a lunatic” ([31], p. 93).
Much philosophical attention has been given to these
terse and cryptic passages in an attempt to understand
the nature of meaning in general, but when taken in the
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context of Wittgenstein’s broader philosophical corpus
they are revelatory with regard to our most basic inter-
actions. Contemporary philosopher Stanley Cavell
(1979), in capturing the moment of recognizing a
“break” in a rule, asks the important question: “Why do
we attach such importance to this that we have to make
of one or other of us an outcast, or make sure that
there is room in the world for both?” ([32], p. 113).
The need here, expressed by Cavell, of either having
to make one of us outcasts or trying to make room for
both, hints at just how the mind takes in anomalies con-
cerning the human being in an everyday, pre-theoretical
sense. From this perspective, Cavell’s statement stands
as microscopic portrayal of the field of mental health
and its relation to the phenomenon of mental disorder:
either one has to take the phenomenon as “ununder-
standable” and drop to the physical stance bereft of
meaning, or one tries to understand it, “make room” for
it. Or one does both. But at any rate, action must be
taken; one must do something. On the other hand, and
perhaps more importantly, it stands as a portrayal of the
relationship we have with ourselves. Either we have to
seal this off–this anomaly–or make room for it. In both
cases, action must be taken; and in both cases seemingly
we are forced to either erect a boundary and seal off the
(so-called) “break” from ourselves, or alternatively, resist
erecting this boundary and change.
The commentary Wittgenstein and Cavell provide on
our basic human interactions suggests that the “ontolo-
gizing of method” and the splitting of our theoretical
orientations satisfy a more basic human need; a need
often overlooked and forgotten in our more explicit ges-
tures at the phenomenon of mental disorder, and yet–to
paraphrase another famed philosopher–residing within
their very warp and woof [33]. The grasping for sense
that takes place in such basic moments of human dis-
connect and analogously in our shared basic gestures at
the phenomenon of mental disorder are the first
attempts at foundation. But this foundation, as Wittgen-
stein and Cavell point out, is built from the shifting dis-
sonance and consonance that make up human
interaction itself and thus is far from stable. In light of
such instability, the formulation of a clear and captivat-
ing “picture” of the phenomenon seems understand-
able–natural, even–but only at the expense of the
phenomenon itself. From this vantage, the medical and
social orientations may themselves be an avoidance of
the general phenomenon they wish to capture.
Concluding Remarks
Recall psychiatrist Anthony Clare’s diagnosis of the
mental health field that opened this paper: “many of us
in the field cannot agree on ‘what we are doing’, let
alone ‘where we are doing it’ and ‘why’.” For as Clare
states, “psychiatry, of all the branches in medicine, is
concerned with the most intricate and challenging ques-
tions concerning human life” [7]. In light of the above
investigations into the roots of these “intricate and chal-
lenging questions” a depth of perspective can now be
added to Clare’s loaded questions.
With regard to “what we are doing,” we find that
“what” we are getting at is nothing other than the
human being. The idea of getting closer to something -
the “where” - whether in here or out there, is only a
helpful heuristic, for we need look no further than our-
selves. And yet, at the same time, and in virtue of being
human, we are closed off because we recognize and
reinforce our separateness, from within and without.
And it is this peculiar if not paradoxical human fact that
both the medical and social orientations could only wish
to pry open, or dissolve altogether. But it could be the
very demand for a solution to this dilemma that guaran-
tees one will never cease to make peace with it.
The field of mental health’s resort to medical or social
orientations, to facts or to values, as a way of gesturing
at the phenomenon is, in part, a way of avoiding it. Say-
ing this is not to suggest that we adopt a new approach
or fine-tune our gestures until we finally get at “some-
thing.” Rather, perhaps we should listen to and observe
that very need (Clare’s “why”), for it is here where we
might find subtle yet revelatory insight into the human
condition, prior to both theory and practice and so in
life.
In light of the above investigations, the stage is now
set for a renewed philosophical basis for integration to
emerge that recognizes and overcomes our attachment
to such deep-seated orientations and is guided by the
people we serve.
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Appendix
Colombo et al. (2003) study, case vignette [6]:
Tom Smith is a 30 year old, white male who is mar-
ried with two children. During the last three days Tom
has stopped eating and has said very little. A psychiatrist
was called who interviewed Tom, his wife and a close
family friend who has known Tom since they were at
school. These interviews revealed the following facts.
About 1 year ago Tom had started to become increas-
ingly withdrawn and preoccupied. According to both his
wife and friend it seemed as though he was in a world
of his own. As time went by he become less interested
in his work and his children. Most of the time Tom
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would sit upstairs on his own, though on occasion he
would become excitable and leave the house, sometimes
not returning for several hours. During the last month
Tom has started to express ideas which his wife finds
difficult to understand.
During the interview Tom was initially reluctant to
talk about his experiences but after a while he became
more relaxed and said that he felt that a religious sect
was putting thoughts into his mind, although he was
unclear as to exactly what these thoughts were about.
He has also heard members of the sect talking about
him as a potential new member though he had never
seen them.
According to Tom’s wife, he has had no previous psy-
chiatric problems. Furthermore, he doesn’t take street
drugs, drinks very little and has had no major operations
since having his tonsils removed when he was 12 years
old.
Tom has two brothers, one older and one younger
than him, neither have had psychiatric problems nor
have any other members of his immediate family except
Tom’s grandmother who received psychiatric treatment
but no-one could remember for what reason.
Tom did not go to school until he was seven as he
was described as a “delicate” child who was slow in
learning to speak properly. When Tom was 8 years old
his uncle, who he was very fond of, unexpectedly died.
Tom was considered a very stubborn child who spent a
lot of time on his own. As a teenager he lacked self-con-
fidence and considered himself as ugly to look at.
Until recently Tom was self-employed. His small busi-
ness, however, was not doing well and as a result he
had a few problems paying bills and the mortgage. Tom
has been married for 5 years but according to his wife
they “always argued with each other.”
The psychiatrist concluded the report by stating that
this is all the information we have on Tom Smith.
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